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Vijay Prashad
How the Hindus Became Jews:
American Racism after 9/11

In November 2001, I traveled to Washington,
DC, for the second Annual South Asian Literary
Festival. At a panel discussion, someone asked
me a pointed question: ‘‘Last year you had come
here to promote your book, Karma of Brown
Folk, and spent quite a long time being critical
of the concept of the model minority. Now, with
all these desis being harassed after 9/11, what do
you think of our being a model minority?’’
Certainly, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty
International, not to speak of the Indian American press and the social network of rumor, had
alerted us to the large number of desis (those who
claim South Asian origin) who have been hassled
by airlines, by the police, and by strangers—all
wary of those of us who look like terrorists. In
a comprehensive review of over a thousand hate
attacks on Arabs and desis, Human Rights Watch
noted, ‘‘This violence was directed at people
solely because they shared or were perceived
as sharing the national background or religion
of the hijackers and al-Qaeda members deemed
responsible for attacking the World Trade Center
and the Pentagon.’’ 1 A report from the South
Asian American Leaders for Tomorrow found
that in the week after 9/11, the U.S. media
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‘‘reported 645 bias incidents directed towards Americans perceived to be of
Middle Eastern descent.’’ 2
Before the government reported on the details of the 9/11 attacks, ordinary people took it on themselves to punish anyone with a turban—that is,
anyone with headgear that resembled the turban worn by Osama bin Laden.
On 9/11, within minutes of the attacks, four men chased after a Sikh man
who had escaped from the towers and now had to escape once more for his
life. In Richmond, Queens, three white youth severely beat up a Sikh man,
other men shot at two Sikh boys, and a white man began to yell at a Sikh
man on the Northern State Parkway, ‘‘You fucking Arab raghead, you’re all
going to die, we’re going to kill every one of you,’’ as all four of those in his
car gave the Sikh man the ﬁnger. Men got the brunt of these attacks, because
turbans are worn mainly by men. Those turbans served to distinguish the
‘‘evildoers.’’
Women faced hostility in diﬀerent spaces, generally not as routine
assaults by those emboldened to be vigilantes for 9/11. But there are also
women who faced the crowd: Meera Kumar, on September 12, 2001, was
removed from an Amtrak train in Boston; in Huntington, New York, an
elderly drunk driver tried to run down a Pakistani woman, followed her into
a store, and threatened to kill her because she’s ‘‘destroying my country’’; in
Los Angeles, on September 13, 2001, an Iranian woman was punched in the
eye by another woman who wanted to register her displeasure at those who
look like terrorists; on September 15, 2001, in Tulsa, Oklahoma, when Kimberly Lowe, a Creek Native American, stopped her car to confront a group
of white males who had yelled, ‘‘Go back to your own country,’’ they pinned
her down and drove over her till she died.
She was mistaken for the wrong kind of Indian.
So when the man at the panel discussion asked me if I had been mistaken about the term model minority after what had been called the ‘‘racial
proﬁling’’ of desis, I took a few minutes to react. Well, a year ago, I had suggested that desis are whites on probation and that if we ever misbehaved,
the power structure would revoke our privileges. So it was easy enough to
say that our probation is over, and we are now to be served with a sentence
of disapprobation.
But this is false. After all, within days, the attacks on desis began to diminish and the U.S. state resumed its general assault on the contingent class.
Racism is not simply prejudice, although this is an important form of subordination. In advanced industrial societies where there is a ‘‘natural rate
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of unemployment,’’ the contingent class that is either permanently unemployed or underemployed ﬁnds itself stigmatized as incompetent or worse.
To keep this class in a subordinate position, the state intensiﬁes its repression through systematic police brutality, incarceration, or harsh forcedwork policies (workfare), and also by the disavowal of public education. That
a disproportionate part of the contingent class is of color, and because of the
culture of racism in U.S. history that has forged what it means to be both
a danger (all but white) and a success (white), the form of subordination is
almost identical to the architecture of U.S. racism.3 What desis experienced
in the months after 9/11 was not state racism, which is reserved for the contingent class, but the enraged prejudice of society fostered by the corporate
media and enﬂamed by the rash words of politicians.
The state’s response to 9/11 had little in common with the routine racial
proﬁling against the contingent class; it had much more to do with the
McCarthyism against Communists half a century ago. The government
began to play the game of six degrees of separation, picking up anyone
who knew anyone who knew one of the hijackers or worshiped at a mosque
that they attended, or whose names appeared in their address books, or
whose name came up in interrogation of anyone picked up for these reasons, or again, anyone who had been under the government’s dragnet
as radical Islamists in one form or another. And then there were those
Muslims who became accidental radical Islamists—pilots, students with
expired visas, and youth with criminal records.4 The repression post-9/11 is
akin to McCarthyism, but here the target is not communism, but Islam—
and, ancillary to it, all political ideologies that challenge the hegemony of
imperialist globalization. If guilt by association became acceptable due to
McCarthyism, it has returned once again after 9/11 to make those who are
Muslim culpable for 9/11. We are in the condition of the Green Scare.5
Those of us who look like terrorists but are not Muslims seem to want to
carry a sign that says, ‘‘I am not a Muslim,’’ as if to say, ‘‘I am not a terrorist.’’
Rumors ﬂew about that the Indian Embassy in Washington asked its
nationals to wear a bindi, to help distinguish ‘‘Indians’’ from Arabs and
Afghans.6 A gay friend called to say that this was the ﬁrst time that he knew
of the Indian government asking its male citizens to adopt drag. Another
friend bitterly mentioned that the bindi had once served as the accumulation of resentment against desis, at least in the 1980s, when the Dotbusters
of New Jersey began a hate campaign against Indian immigrants. Now that
Madonna had made the bindi fashionable, the rumor mills had begun to

586 Vijay Prashad

oﬀer it as protection against the revanchism that followed 9/11. Talk of the
bindi went about as a way for some to suggest it as an adequate sign of being
a Hindu, or at least not a Muslim.
What we miss is that as Islam becomes imperialist globalization’s Green
Menace, Muslim has come to stand in for those who look or sound like
immigrants.
So if Muslim stands in for immigrant, we should follow philosopher
Etienne Balibar’s insistence that immigration ‘‘becomes the main name
given to race within the crisis-torn nations of the post-colonial era.’’ 7 Muslim
begins to be seen in the logic of race, with all those who look like Muslims
being treated in a certain way, and all those who are Muslims being harassed
by the state, but—and this returns to my point about the contingent class—
whereas in France (Balibar’s home terrain), Algerians do form part of the
contingent class in sizable numbers, this is not the case in the United States.
Black Muslims certainly ﬁgure among the U.S. contingent, but the harassment they face is mostly for being black in the contingent world.8
All Muslims are suspects by association, but those who had come into
even ﬂeeting contact with the organs of Islamic radicalism are fair game for
arrest and interrogation.9
Many who are not Muslims try to tell the country that they are not the bad
ones, that being Sikh or Hindu or even atheists they should not be harassed.
But the gaze of imperial whiteness does not discriminate between the dusky
bodies. In its eyes, we are all Muslims.
Because of the power of the state and the corporate media, we are not
immune to this logic.We have begun to see ourselves through their eyes. As
we walk down the street, whatever our religion or provenance, we wonder
whether those around us see us as a problem. ‘‘Mom, look at the terrorist!
I’m frightened!’’
Cringe, cower, paste that sickly smile on your face, exaggerate your
American accent, and disappear into the fantasy life in your mind: a renewed nostalgia for the homeland.10
Some Indian Americans sought shelter from this storm not so much in
the category of ‘‘whiteness,’’ but in an attempt to manufacture an alliance
with Jewish American organizations. The game for this set of inﬂuential
Indian Americans was to see in Jewish Americans a model for their own
attempt not simply to gain respectability in mainstream America, but to
gain power in Washington. These are the ‘‘Hindus’’ who want to repudiate
the hundreds of millions of Muslims in South Asia, to create an image of
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the Indian as a victim of Muslim terrorism in South Asia, and therefore the
Indian American’s dilemma as akin to the Jewish American’s distress over
Muslim terrorism in Israel. That those who operate with terrorist means
are not simply Muslims is the exact idea that had to be demolished, because
what allowed ‘‘Hindus’’ and ‘‘Jews’’ to become kin relied principally on the
reduction of Palestinians and Kashmiris to ‘‘Muslim.’’
The text above slips between Indian and Hindu, and speaks of Muslim
and Jew with conﬁdence, although sometimes in quotes. The hesitancy
comes partly because there is far too much heterogeneity within these categories: Hindu is not a coherent entity, rent as it is not only by theological disputes but also by the many political disagreements, as well as the
everyday divides of gender and caste. But there is a far more particular reason for the tentativeness with these terms. If we run three of the terms in
sequence (Jewish-Hindu-Muslim), one point is revealed: they are no longer
terms that deﬁne only religions or religious experience. Muslim has come
to refer to a global community of Muslims who adhere to a singular theocratic ideology (Islam) reinforced by a clergy that interprets a single book
(the Koran). The varieties of religious experience within Muslim are rarely
acknowledged, or else very rarely explored by the uninitiated. The term Jewish has come to refer less to religion and more to culture. We assume that
regardless of their political or theological commitments, all those who are
born in a Jewish family are Jews because of the culture of Judaism. The
association of something called ‘‘Jewish culture’’ enables conservative activists of the Hindu Right to claim that regardless of one’s religion or politics,
any Indian is culturally a Hindu. Hindu culture, in this logic, is like Jewish culture, and the modular form of a religious culture being the culture
of a people circumvents any suggestion of diversity within the category: all
those who are Indian are part of Hindu culture, even if they are not Hindus,
and Jews are always Jews because, despite their religious and political diﬀerences, they exist within Jewish culture. If ‘‘Muslims’’ form part of the global
community of Islam, then Indian Muslims are more Muslim than Indian;
if all those of India are Hindus, then Indian Muslims are Hindus when they
deny their place in the global community of Islam. This conservative chain
of command is of central concern for this essay, and even though I won’t
refer to this problem explicitly again, it forms an important consideration
for us.
Events and processes that appear to be fundamentally outside the story
of the United States, at least after 9/11, are a fundamental component of
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domestic race and racism. It is my contention that race in the United States
after 9/11 has to be seen on a global scale, because planetary events lean
upon the social construction and reconﬁguration of identity within the
United States. Jewish American identity has, at least since 1967, been in
direct contact with the place of Israel in world aﬀairs, and since 9/11, the
importance of the links between India and Israel have fashioned one section of the desi community. Those of us who study racism and racial formation in the United States need to pay more and more attention not to
the comparative study of racism, but to the way race in the United States is
constructed with an eye to global events. In my own earlier work I argued
that the fear factor of ‘‘blacks’’ created the conditions for the construction
of the Indian American (and the Asian American in general) as the model
minority, whereas now I will argue that this is insuﬃcient. It is the terror of
the ‘‘Muslim’’ alongside antiblack racism that provides the political space for
Jewish Americans and Indian (or sometimes Hindu) Americans to mitigate
their cultural diﬀerence from the mainstream, but crucially to put themselves forward as those who, because of their experience with terrorism,
become the vanguard of the new, antiterrorist battleship America.
An Axis of Good?
On September 8, 2003, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon arrived in New
Delhi to spend the second anniversary of 9/11 with his Indian counterpart.
This was the ﬁrst visit by an Israeli prime minister in its ﬁve-decade history, and it came at a propitious time. Right-wing governments ruled in Tel
Aviv, New Delhi, and Washington, and all three wanted to fashion an alliance against what they understood to be their principal adversary: what they
called Islamic terrorism.11
While the alliance emerged between the governments, others plotted an
alliance between two minority communities within the United States: Jewish Americans and Indian Americans. If Israel and India (as well as the
United States) formulated a new approach to each other, then Jewish Americans and Indian Americans might do so with each other. The idea that Jewish Americans are a valuable model for Indian Americans is not novel. In
1994, when Gopal Raju, the publisher of India Abroad (the leading Indian
American weekly newspaper), founded the Indian American Center for
Political Awareness (IACPA), he had much the same thing in mind. Raju’s
worthy goal had been to draw Indian Americans into U.S. politics and to
educate U.S. representatives on things Indian.12 When Raju started IACPA,

American Racism after 9/11

589

he hired onto its staﬀ Ralph Nurnberger. Nurnberger, who is now the governmental aﬀairs counsel at the prestigious and controversial Washington
lobbying ﬁrm Preston Gates,13 brought to IACPA his experience as the legislative liaison for the American Israel Public Aﬀairs Committee (AIPAC). A
former staﬀ member of IACPA told me that Raju hired Nurnberger because
he believed that Indian Americans needed to follow the example of Jewish Americans.14 Another small minority within the United States, Jewish
Americans, Raju is reported to have said, had made decisive inroads into
the U.S. Congress on behalf of Israel. Indian Americans, he held, needed to
adopt this strategy on behalf of India.
After 9/11 the links between Jewish American and Indian American
groups, as well as members of Congress, increased astronomically. In the
summer of 2002, two high-proﬁle Indian American groups began talks
with the two premier lobbying outﬁts that claim to represent both the
Jewish American community and Israel, the American Jewish Committee
(AJCommittee) and AIPAC. The Indian American groups wanted to learn
how best to inﬂuence policy in Washington. Talks by AIPAC leaders and
workshops by AJCommittee staﬀ members introduced the Indian American organizations to lobbying in the corridors of American power. A year
later, AJCommittee honored India’s national security adviser at its annual
dinner, while it held a special dinner for India’s home minister. In addition, a host of U.S. congressional leaders gave talks at Indian American
gatherings, favorably compared Indian Americans to Jewish Americans,
and applauded the increased links between India and Israel. Leaders of the
India Caucus in the U.S. House of Representatives, elected oﬃcials from
both the Democratic and Republican Parties, took turns praising Indian
Americans, whose access to votes and cash appeals to politicians from
heavily Indian American districts, including parts of New Jersey, Illinois,
New York, and Texas. In such districts, Indian Americans have the highest
per capita income.
For a community that numbers about 1.5 million, only about 0.5 percent
of the U.S. population, such attention is unprecedented and incredible. For
a community that is generally invisible in the halls of power, it came as a
surprise to suddenly experience such attention.
The Myth of the ‘‘Same Extremist Enemy’’
Shortly after 9/11, a group of Indian Americans formed the Indian American Political Action Committee (INAPAC) in New Jersey. Not long after
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its creation, INAPAC substantially dissolved, and another lobbying group
emerged in Washington: the United States India Political Action Committee (USINPAC). It took over the space opened up by INAPAC and allowed
itself to be adopted by AJCommittee and AIPAC. USINPAC held two related
briefs: to ensure that Indian Americans enjoy the same amount of political
power it feels is held by the Jewish American community, and to deploy that
power in the service of India, preferably in an Indo-U.S. alliance in the image
of the U.S.-Israeli entente. The ideological unity between Israel, India, and
the United States preached by USINPAC is this: to ﬁght terrorism, namely
‘‘Islamic militancy,’’ ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism,’’ ‘‘Islamic extremism,’’ or, in
the words of Congressman Tom Lantos (Democrat from California), ‘‘mindless, vicious, fanatic Islamic terrorism.’’ 15 If we all agree that the enemy is
Islamic terrorism, then the United States, Israel, and India have an urgent
need for an axis.
INAPAC, and then USINPAC, has worked closely with members of the
AJCommittee and AIPAC. Ann Schaﬀer, director of the AJCommittee’s Belfer Center for American Pluralism, said of the AJCommittee’s assistance
toward INAPAC, ‘‘We shared with them the Jewish approach to political
activism. We want to give them the tools to further their political agenda.’’
When asked about the common ‘‘political agenda’’ between Jewish Americans and Indian Americans, the AJCommittee’s Washington, DC, regional
director, Charles Brooks, said, ‘‘We’re ﬁghting the same extremist enemy.
We want to help them become more eﬀective in communicating their political will.’’ 16 Who is that global enemy? The proﬀered answer is Islamic
extremism, but in some incarnations, the enemy seems to be global Islam
in general, or else anyone who dares to challenge the supremacy of the
current geopolitical dispensation (which goes by many names: free-market
theorists call it globalization, whereas its critics call it imperialist globalization; the U.S. State Department describes it as the export of democracy,
whereas its critics call it U.S. imperialism). What is crucial to my analysis is
that U.S. power does not target global Islam as its enemy, even as al-Qaeda is
the current assailant. The animus of U.S. imperialism is directed at all those
forces that resist its hegemony, from the guerrillas in the Americas (FARC
in Colombia, for example) to the North Korean regime. It is convenient for
al-Qaeda, Sharonism, and Hindutva (Hinduness) to reduce U.S. policy to an
enmity against Islam itself for their own reasons (for al-Qaeda, to appeal to
its radical Islamist base; for Sharonism and Hindutva, to purport that their
state policy is identical to U.S. state policy).
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The chairman of the board of trustees for INAPAC, Jesal Amin, argued
that the ‘‘terrorists’’ who target Israel are ‘‘interconnected with the Muslim terror groups operating elsewhere in the Middle East and South Asia.’’
Amin, who is active in the Republican Party in a very prosperous and overwhelmingly white area of New Jersey, adopts the view that is commonplace
among Israeli conservatives that any Muslim who acts against the interests
of Israel, or here India, is a terrorist, whether it is the Palestinian Liberation
Organization or Hamas, the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front or the
Lashkar-e-Toiba. But he is not alone in this strategic reduction. Sue Ghosh
Sticklett, a member of USINPAC’s Defense and Strategic Aﬀairs Committee, told a conservative publication, ‘‘Our no. 1 legislative priority in 2004
is terrorism. . . . the terrorism directed against India is the same as that
directed against the United States and Israel.We would like to see closer ties
between the United States and India. Right now, India feels that Israel is a
closer friend than the United States, and we would like to change that.’’ 17 In
other words, it is valuable to reduce all forms of violence to ‘‘terrorism’’ in
order to facilitate a geopolitical, economic alliance between India and the
United States—regardless of the costs that others must bear for the prosperity that it will generate for a few.
Since the 1980s, one strand of the Indian American community has made
it very clear that it lives within a worldview known as Hindutva (Hinduness).
A political ideology within India that draws from European racist ideas of
nationhood, Hindutva has taken the view, since its emergence in the 1920s,
that Muslims do for it what Jews do for Nazism. In the United States such
a view makes no sense, and it is translated into what I have called ‘‘Yankee
Hindutva,’’ where the Hindutva adherent relies upon liberal multiculturalism to give it space to develop its generally illiberal political identity that
opposes not only Muslims, whether conservative or liberal, but also anything that it deems to be progressive and therefore a challenge to Hindutva.
If there is any movement that cannot be held at bay, such as feminism, Hindutva attempts to accommodate it by attempting to glorify women who are
independent and ‘‘traditional.’’ 18 Amin and Ghosh Sticklett’s theory is so
common now among upwardly mobile Indian Americans that one of its
children, twenty-one-year-old Nishkam Gupta, enlisted to ﬁght in the 2003
U.S. war in Iraq as part of his desire to ‘‘ﬁght the larger war against terrorism,
a war that would directly beneﬁt Hinduism and its cause.’’ 19 Kapil Sharma,
a consultant for the generally liberal IACPA, says, ‘‘We should be educated
about each other’s issues, so we can talk about Kashmir and Palestine’’—the
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two areas of the world that, in the Indo-Israeli convergence, are now considered as parallels.20 The Hindutva-Sharonist framework has leaked into the
lives of those generally not predisposed to cruel and macho nationalism.
There are several problems with the formulation oﬀered by people such
as Amin, Sticklett, and the AJCommittee. They assume that the Jihad International grows out of whole cloth from Islam, from a few suras in the Koran,
or else from the medieval history of Arabia.21 There is a complete disregard for the history of the Jihad International—how it came to be, its social
forces, how the United States and the Saudis, for instance, encouraged and
ﬁnanced it as an alternative to the growth of republicanism and communism.22 The Jihad International draws from the frustrations of a generation of mainly men who had been betrayed by the states that claimed the
mantle of anticolonial republicanism. Drawing from the detritus of social
thought in their home regions, these groups remained largely anachronistic and without strength until the United States gave them legitimacy and
the Saudis began to fund them, principally for the Afghan campaign against
the Soviets, but also in the war over Marxist South Yemen.23
Groups like Hamas and the various factions in Kashmir certainly share
ideological resources with the broader Jihad International, but they are also
rooted in nationalist struggles.24 There is little doubt that Hamas and the
various jihadi factions in Kashmir are a serious problem for the social development of their respective regions. Although Hamas does provide basic
social services alongside its general policy of violence, this welfare is hardly
to be considered valuable given the context within which it is oﬀered. But to
cast the Palestinians and the Kashmiris and others as the ‘‘extremist enemy’’
without a sense of how such factions attained prominence in their various
struggles is to miss the hand of imperialism. Such a view also omits the
many other Palestinian and Kashmiri organizations that revile the tactic of
terror and the general social vision of Hamas and the Kashmiri groups, as
well as the views of those who want as much to make a living as to change
the world. To leave all this out erases the visions of social justice in such
places, renders Islam itself into a one-dimensional tragedy, and casts out
any hope for the progressive elements that strive against immense odds to
turn the direction of the struggle around.
Furthermore, to render ‘‘terrorism’’ and ‘‘terrorists’’ as the enemy fails to
distinguish between the tactics that a people use and the social and political
conditions that generate their hostility: to defeat those who use terrorism,
one has to understand and deal with the conditions that produce those who
take to terror.25 All this is irrelevant to AIPAC-USINPAC.
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The Myth of the Pro-Israel Lobby
On July 16, 2003, the AJCommittee, the AIPAC, and the USINPAC held
their ﬁrst joint brieﬁng. Congressman Frank Pallone, a New Jersey Democrat and former cochair of the India Caucus of the U.S. Congress, said, ‘‘One
of the ﬁrst things I would hear whenever I went around to the Indian American communities was how we can emulate the Jewish community, particularly how can we emulate AIPAC—in terms of their lobbying abilities,
their grass-roots abilities, their ability to organize the community politically.’’ 26 Kumar Barve, the highest elected Indian American and majority
leader in the Maryland House of Delegates, told the Washington Post, ‘‘I
think Indian Americans see the American Jewish community as a yardstick
against which to compare themselves. It’s seen as the gold standard in terms
of political activism.’’ 27 ‘‘A lot of folks in the Indian American community,’’
reported Ajay Kuntamukkala, the president of the South Asian Bar Association of Washington, DC, ‘‘look at what Jews have done and try to model
themselves after it.’’ 28
There are fewer than 6 million Jews in the United States, just about 2 percent of the population. If they can determine U.S. foreign policy, then they
should certainly be a model for all communities that have the same agenda.
AIPAC, without a doubt, is a very strong lobbying organization. With
an annual budget in excess of $15 million, a group of registered lobbyists,
and a staﬀ in the hundreds, AIPAC can send out the troops to patrol the
halls of Congress if any bill inimical to Sharonist interest appears on the
ﬂoor. The genius of AIPAC is that it sits at the center of almost a hundred
pro-Israel groups and coordinates their donations. These myriad political
action groups—‘‘which draw money from Jewish donors and operate under
obscure-sounding names—are operated by AIPAC oﬃcials or people who
hold seats on AIPAC’s two major policymaking bodies.’’ 29 Money lubricates
the U.S. political system, and AIPAC has been able to strategically use its
funds to gain the support of a slew of elected representatives.
Political scientist Stephen Zunes points out, ‘‘The Aerospace Industry
Association which promotes these massive arms shipments to Israel is even
more inﬂuential’’ than the pro-Israel lobby. The ‘‘general thrust of US policy
would be pretty much the same even if AIPAC didn’t exist. We didn’t need
a pro-Indonesia lobby to support Indonesia in its savage repression of East
Timor all these years.’’ 30 In other words, AIPAC is powerful not because of
its use of money alone, but decisively because of the strategic convergence
of interests between Israel, AIPAC, and the U.S. Congress.31
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The U.S. Congress stands united behind Israel. Any dissension is met
with the reproach of anti-Semitism. If this is the work of the pro-Israel
lobby, then it has achieved a remarkable feat: a totally bipartisan Congress
with little opposition to its general goals. However, as most electoral and
campaign ﬁnance data show, most American Jews tend to lean toward the
Democratic Party, so why should the Republicans come out so strongly for
Israel? 32
Two public policy organizations give us a sense of an answer: the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) and the Jewish Institute
for National Security Aﬀairs (JINSA). Martin Indyk, who worked as research director at AIPAC, founded WINEP in 1985 to produce policy papers
on Israel in order to strengthen U.S.-Israeli relations. In 1988, WINEP
published Building for Peace: An American Strategy for the Middle East,
which focused on what the Bush administration must do about the IsraeliPalestinian process. WINEP concluded that the U.S. government should
‘‘resist pressures for a procedural breakthrough until conditions have ripened,’’ that is, until the Palestinian resistance had been broken. Six members of the WINEP study group that wrote this report entered the administration of George H. W. Bush, which, as it happened, adopted the Sharonist
line to alienate the PLO despite its recognition of Israel at the Palestinian
National Council of November 1988.33
While WINEP tends to hew the line of whatever Israeli party comes to
power, JINSA is the U.S. oﬀshoot of the Likud Party. Set up in 1997, both
JINSA and the Project for a New American Century (PNAC) drew from the
most conservative hawks in the U.S. establishment for its board of directors:
Richard Cheney (now vice president), John Bolton (now undersecretary of
state), Douglas Feith (now undersecretary of defense), Paul Wolfowitz (now
deputy of defense), Lewis Libby (now the vice president’s chief of staﬀ ),
Zalmay Khalilzad (now U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan), Richard Armitage (now deputy secretary of state), Elliott Abrams (now National Security Council adviser), and Richard Perle (formerly on the Defense Policy
Board). Perle and Feith, among others, drafted a paper titled ‘‘A Clean
Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm,’’ published by the Institute for Advanced Strategic Political Studies (Washington and Jerusalem),
that urged the Israeli government to repudiate Oslo, to permanently annex
the occupied territories, to overthrow the regime of Saddam Hussein (and
restore the Hashemite monarchy)—this last, ‘‘an important Israeli strategic objective in its own right.’’ Netanyahu, as prime minister of Israel at the
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time, rejected the report, particularly the adventurism against Iraq. When
George W. Bush came to power in 2001, he adopted it, not because he
was pushed by the pro-Israel lobby but because of the U.S. neoconservative
vision for U.S. power in the world.34
The idea of the power of the pro-Israel lobby is attractive because it draws
upon at least a few hundred years of anti-Semitic worry about an international conspiracy operated by Jewish ﬁnanciers to defraud the European
and American working poor of their livelihoods. The ‘‘Jew,’’ without a country, but with a bank, had no loyalty to the nation, no solidarity with fellow
citizens. The anti-Semitic document Protocols of the Elders of Zion is a good
illustration of this idea.35 The Nazis stigmatized the ‘‘Jew’’ as the problem of
poverty and exploitation and obscured the role played by capitalism in the
reproduction of grief. The 6 million Jews in the United States do not determine U.S. foreign policy, nor are they united as one. Jews in America, like
other communities, are rent with division, not united behind one agenda.
When Charles Brooks of the AJCommittee says, ‘‘We’re ﬁghting the same
extremist enemy,’’ the question to ask is, Who is included in ‘‘we’’?
AJCommittee and AIPAC do not speak for all Jews in the United States,
for the mythical ‘‘American Jewish community.’’ The community is fractured on its support for the various political parties and agendas in Israel,
as well as the importance of being behind Israel at all. Those who dissent
from Sharonism are, however, part of a weakened tradition that has been
unable to combat the overwhelming but incorrect notion that any criticism
of Israel is anti-Semitic.36 In my two decades in the United States, in almost
all the struggles with which I have been involved (from the antiapartheid
movement to the El Salvador solidarity work to labor struggles to antiwar
work, to work against the destruction of the U.S. welfare net, and so on),
there have always been those of Jewish ancestry. The river of radicalism runs
deeply through the world of American Jewry. This tradition is well analyzed
by the philosopher Judith Butler:
The ethical framework within which most progressive Jews operate
takes the form of the following question: will we be silent (and thereby
collaborate with illegitimately violent power), or will we make our
voices heard (and be counted among those who did what they could to
stop that violence), even if speaking poses a risk? The current Jewish
critique of Israel is often portrayed as insensitive to Jewish suﬀering,
past as well as present, yet its ethic is based on the experience of suffering, in order that suﬀering might stop.37
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The strand of anti-Sharonist politics among American Jews draws strength
from the litany of anti-Sharonist organizations within Israel itself.38 Again,
this is a weak tradition with limited traction over a society that has produced
an overwhelming consensus.
AIPAC and its confreres are powerful, but they do not determine U.S. foreign policy. They are powerful not just because of their money, but because
their views converge with those of the neoconservative elements that dominate the Middle East policy formation team of the ruling coalition in Washington. Until the 1967 war, few American Jews wanted to identify themselves with Israel. In his 1957 survey of Jewish American attitudes, the
sociologist Nathan Glazer found that Israel ‘‘had remarkably slight eﬀects
on the inner life of American Jewry.’’ 39 Only one in twenty American Jews
traveled to Israel before June 1967, and intellectuals at an AJCommittee
symposium on Jewish identity held a few months before the war barely considered Israel in their comments. After the war, when Israel became a crucial player in U.S. strategy, Israel became, according to Norman Podhoretz,
editor of the neoconservative Commentary, ‘‘the religion of the American
Jews,’’ at least of the mainstream Zionist organizations.40 When AIPAC and
the AJCommittee go to Washington now, they meet receptive, even eager
ears. The lobbyists did not create the conditions for Israel’s elevation. U.S.
foreign policy did the work for them.
The Myth of the Model Minority
If AIPAC does not have a major, or decisive, impact on U.S. foreign policy,
it has certainly come to play a crucial role in the Jewish American community. As Esther Kaplan of Jews for Ethnic and Racial Justice said on her radio
show, Beyond the Pale, in 2002, groups like AIPAC and AJCommittee leverage their closeness to U.S. power to claim the mantle of the Jewish American
mainstream for themselves. Even if AIPAC does not represent the majority
or the plurality of American Jews, it claims to be representative and attempts
to fulﬁll its claim. AIPAC’s proximity to Sharonism and its claim to be the
representative of Jewish America mean that the community appears to be
far more conservative than it perhaps is. Do all Jewish Americans align with
the views of AIPAC and the AJCommittee, or indeed with Sharon? No.What
is more important is the way immigrant or ethnic organizations pose as representative to the power structure regardless of their actual depth in their
community.
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Immigrants in the United States have an idiosyncratic relationship to
the world of politics. Take the case of desis. Despite the racist divisions
in our civil society, there is no referendum or election process for the
leader of each of the social communities. So how does ‘‘ethnic leadership’’
emerge? There are some organic processes—for example, the eﬀorts of
community organizations that not only represent the community but also
constitute and reproduce it. The regional and linguistic groups (Gujarat
Samaj, Tamil Sangam) are one example, and so are the national professional groups (Asian American Hotel Owners Association, American Association of Physicians of Indian Origin). Then there are those groups that
work within the community to transform practices undesirable to some or
to fashion a new desi social culture (women’s rights groups, gay and lesbian
groups, workers’ rights groups). The people who could be leaders are those
who put their energy into these organizations and into the reproduction of
the desi community through the festivals and protests, the gatherings for
joy and justice. But, as with most post-1965 immigrant groups, the leaders
of these organizations are not the most visible representatives of the community in the realm of electoral politics.
It takes little to set up a political shop: the name of an organization, a
patron among one or the other party or lobby group, some letterhead, a
fairly dynamic leader, and preferably a photograph or two of this leader with
an important white politician from one of the two major parties and/or an
important politician from the homeland. The picture with the white politician is almost suﬃcient to indicate that our fearless leader has cachet in
the world of Washington, and his or her backdoor to power allows him or
her to play a disproportionate role as the ‘‘representative’’ of the immigrant
community before the established power structure. These ﬁgures become
brokers for the major parties as they try to reach out to the immigrant communities for votes, and they become symbolic ﬁgureheads for the community itself. USINPAC is one such immigrant entity.
AIPAC and the Indian American high-proﬁle groups not only use their
closeness to U.S. power; they also wield the myth of the model minority to
capture the hearts and minds of their constituency and to make a broader
appeal in a country wedded to antiblack racism. The Indian American community is rent with divisions, and within U.S. domestic politics the tendency has been for Indian Americans to lean toward liberalism (in its organized form, the Democratic Party).41 While there is no good survey data on
Indian American social and political attitudes, my own reading of the ethno-
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graphic literature and my own political involvement in the community suggest that the bulk of desis are against immigration controls and the death
penalty, for the right of a woman to control her own body (or at least against
the ban on abortion), for better wages for working people, for better care
for the elderly, for health insurance coverage. Among second-generation
desis the trend of liberalism runs deeper.42 With the fear of terror, manipulations by groups like USINPAC, and the consolidation of professional success for a sizable section of the community, there has been a perceptible
turn to conservatism.43
Jesal Amin, of INAPAC, praises Indian culture for its emphasis on higher
education: ‘‘We have made the American dream come true. Many Indians
are professional. One of the reasons for working together with the Jewish
community is that we are so similar in terms of education, and from an
economic point of view.’’ 44 Tom Lantos, a Jewish Democrat from California and an immigrant from Hungary, goes over the top: ‘‘There is a natural symbiotic relationship between the Indian community and the Jewish
community,’’ he said. ‘‘It begins with respect for life. There is no community for whom the sacredness of life is as prominent in its philosophy than
the Indian community and we Jews—when we drink, we say ‘Raﬁat’ which
means life.’’ On a more practical level, he says, ‘‘there is a profound relationship in our passionate commitment to education. We have a passionate
commitment to respect for others, for the rule of law and for democracy,
and lately, we’ve been brought together by our joint ﬁght against mindless,
vicious, fanatic Islamic terrorism.’’ 45
How does one even begin to analyze these banal generalities? Do all Jews
and Indians have a passionate respect for others? Even those Indians (perhaps he means Hindus) who killed innocent people in Gujarat in 2002, or
those Jews (as Israeli citizens) who killed the Palestinians of Jenin in 2002?
Is the assumption that a people have a culture that is singular not itself a
species of racialist thinking that we must abhor? These are some basic questions that are worth posing.46 When Congressman Lantos says that Jews and
Indians are passionate about education, when Amin says that Jews and Indians are similar in terms of education, do they mean that there are people in
the world who are not interested or invested in education, who would prefer illiteracy? What does it mean to say that some people are favored, are
chosen, if not to also say that there are others who are misbegotten?
In 1965, after a century of struggle and sacriﬁce, the movement for civil
rights won an impressive victory. The U.S. state adopted a bill that gave every
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citizen formal equality before the law, thereby annulling the premise of
Jim Crow segregation. The victory was immense, but partial. It demolished
formal equality, but it did not say anything about the everyday inequality
that had been structured into every aspect of social life. As one of the architects of the classical civil rights movement, Bayard Rustin, put it, ‘‘The very
decade which has witnessed the decline of legal Jim Crow has also seen the
rise of de facto segregation in our most fundamental socioeconomic institutions.’’ 47 The movement against racism was interested in much greater freedoms than simply the right to vote, one of which was the demand for reparations or a transfer of capital stolen from labor that had not been paid for
centuries. The famous 1963 march on Washington was called, for instance,
the March on Washington for Civil Rights and Jobs. The reforms of the U.S.
state did not address this crucial demand. When the generally peaceful and
hopeful civil rights movement transmuted into the more violent and embittered Black Power movement, the U.S. state and its intellectuals revised
their older racist notions and practices for what has been called the New
Racism of our epoch. That is, the state must now treat everyone equal before
the law, economic demands are left outside the purview of the question of
race, and certain previously oppressed people (such as Jews and Asians) can
obtain some privileges, while those who are the descendants of enslaved
people are left penniless, hopeless, and therefore one step from criminality.
When the mainly black community of Watts, Los Angeles, rose in rebellion in 1965, the U.S. state appeared incensed and shocked. In a mainstream
periodical in 1966, one of the ﬁrst positive articles about Asians appeared.
Once reviled as the Yellow Peril, Chinese Americans, the article said, believe
in ‘‘the old idea that people should depend on their own eﬀorts—not a welfare check—in order to reach America’s ‘promised land.’’’ This autonomous
eﬀort, the magazine noted, came at ‘‘a time when it is being proposed that
hundreds of billions of dollars be spent to uplift Negroes and other minorities.’’ 48 That same year, Irving Kristol asked in the New York Times Magazine,
‘‘Can the Negro be expected to follow the path of previous immigrant groups
[Jews and Italians] or is his a special, ‘pathological’ case?’’ What is being said
is this: the Asians work hard without complaint, and so should the blacks;
the Jews work hard, and so should the blacks. This erases the hard work
and low pay endured by African Americans, most of whom, because of the
incomplete dismantling of the Jim Crow structure, did not have access to
any other kind of work. Kristol wrote, ‘‘The real tragedy of the American
Negro today is not that he is poor, or black, but that he is a latecomer—he
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confronts a settled and highly organized society whose assimilatory powers
have markedly declined over the past decades.’’ 49 But Africans had been
brought to the Americas long before Jews and Italians, so that when Kristol
says ‘‘latecomers,’’ he must mean to the feast of capital, since most blacks
worked to produce the bounty that was divided among some whites in an
earlier time. By this logic, blacks are blamed for the failures of American
history.50
Jews, long reviled by the U.S. power structure, like Asians, became acceptable only in the late 1960s, as beneﬁciaries of the New Racism and of the victory of Israel in 1967.51 The Indians that came to the United States because
of the 1965 immigration reforms also beneﬁted from this New Racism:
before these laws we were regarded as blacks, but after them we could aspire
to whiteness. Arriving in the United States in droves between the mid1960s and the early 1980s, Indian Americans rose in the ranks of their professions and made very high salaries. But their attainments are not caused
by natural or cultural selection. If this were the case, the 1 billion Indians in
India would all be doctors and nurses, engineers and scientists. Rather, it
was the result of state selection, whereby the U.S. state, through the special
skills provision in the 1965 Immigration Act, fundamentally conﬁgured the
demography of Indian America. Between 1965 and 1977, 83 percent of the
migrants came with advanced degrees.
State selection, not the natural selection of millennia, brought highly
qualiﬁed desis to the United States. Those who hold power in the United
States use the anomalous demographic of professional desis to show that we
succeed while other minorities fail, that we succeed because we work hard,
while they fail because they are either incapable or lazy. The history of why
we succeed is lost in this simple story. And thanks to its loss of history, the
stereotype tends to conﬁrm antiblack racism.
Why should Jewish Americans and Indian Americans get together?
Because they are human beings, because some may share ideological positions, because a few may share personal tastes—these are less oﬀensive
ways to create solidarity than to bear heavily upon us with the burden of
stereotyped traditions (peaceful people, etc.) or else to leverage our friendship on the backs of blacks. The latter, as the novelist Toni Morrison wrote,
is a typical, homespun strategy for advancement in the United States: the
immigrant, she noted, must participate ‘‘freely in this most enduring and
eﬃcient rite of passage into American culture: negative appraisals of the
native-born black population. Only when the lesson of racial estrangement
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is learned is assimilation complete. Whatever the lived experience of immigrants with African Americans—pleasant, beneﬁcial, or bruising—the rhetorical experience renders blacks as non-citizens, already discredited outlaws.’’ 52 Jews and Indians, both of whom live in a racist polity, take shelter
in the false praises of their greatness. Far better to be seen as good than evil,
but at what social cost do a people want acclaim? Who pays for desis to be
the ‘‘model minority’’?
The high-proﬁle organizations leverage their proximity to power and their
ideology of the model minority to attract large numbers of desis into their
ranks, or else into the tug of their beliefs. The cost of this, however, is to
leave desis outside the major struggles for social justice that is the best thing
about America.
Strange Bedfellows
Politics does make strange bedfellows. Two decades ago, the alliance between Indian American and Jewish American groups would have seemed
impossible.53 For one, the Indian government was not openly in favor of
the Israeli state—a mark against it, from AIPAC’s point of view. When it
declined to issue visas to Israeli delegations, particularly to sports teams,
the Indian government earned the ire of U.S.-based Jewish organizations.
In 1987, the Anti-Defamation League, for instance, wrote, ‘‘It is time for the
international community to let India know that unless it ceases to inject its
anti-Israel policies into events aimed at furthering the spirit of international
cooperation, it will be forced to forfeit its frequent role as host nation.’’ 54
The alliance between Indian American and Jewish American mainstream
organizations plainly has little to do with ‘‘cultural values,’’ but a lot to do
with the geopolitical alliance between India and Israel. When it comes to
Israel, the AJCommittee and the AIPAC will make alliances with anyone
who, for whatever reason, is willing to defend the right of the Sharonists to
make mayhem in West Asia. Jason F. Isaacson, director of government and
international aﬀairs of the AJCommittee, told the press, ‘‘All three countries [India, Israel, and the United States] really need to stick together not
only because of the common threats of terrorism but because of commonalities and values, and that is the message we are going to convey.’’ 55 These
common values are not shared by all Indians, Israelis, and Americans in the
same way: they may want to do diﬀerent things when faced with speciﬁc
forms of terror that come from very particular social forces.
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What does this have to say about race in post-9/11 America? As the ‘‘Muslim’’ increasingly bears the mark of Cain, it opens up immense opportunities for middle-class people of color to demonstrate their patriotism in antiIslamic terms. For the contingent working class, such an opportunity is not
aﬀorded, as I suggested in the opening section. Those who are of color in
this class fragment bear the brunt of systemic racism, and their patriotism
is easily eclipsed by their imputed immorality and criminality. Those who
are not prone to functional unemployment or contingent status and are of
color as a block are mainly immigrants like those from South Asia. Race,
since 9/11, has not included desis as victims of racial proﬁling and thereby
expanded the targets for state racism. It has instead fashioned a complex
racial landscape where groups jockey to get out from under the racist gaze
of society and the racist policies of the state. For such immigrants, the post9/11 scenario oﬀers few decent options: either claim solidarity with a people
who have become the image of international terrorism, or else pledge your
patriotism through abjuration of any cultural links with Islam or Muslims,
indeed to make the ‘‘Muslim’’ your enemy. If the ‘‘Muslim’’ becomes your
enemy, and if you have the cultural capital to ﬂy above the quicksand of the
contingent class, then you have the opportunity to be ‘‘American.’’
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